N. Pokalova
Lipetsk
Russia’s March 2000 presidential election
represents one step forward and two steps back for Russian democracy. For the first time
in Russian’s history power within the Kremlin has changed hands through an electoral
process. The election not only took place but was conducted as constitutionally
prescribed, no small achievement for a country with Russia’s authoritarian history.
More than two-thirds of the eligible voters participated, and they appeared to make
informed choices among a range of candidates who offered competing platforms, policies,
and leadership styles. The election, however, was not contested on a level playing field.
The winner, acting president Vladimir Putin, enjoyed tremendous advantages that tainted
the process. Although weak in some arenas, the Russian state still enjoys too much power
with respect to the electoral process, while nongovernmental forces - political parties,
civic organizations, trade unions, and independent business groups - remain too weak to
shape the outcomes of elections.
Does this latest election represent a fundamental turn away from
democratic practices or merely a temporary setback for democratic consolidation in Russia?
It is too early to tell. Putin may turn out to be Russia’s Milosevich. Or he may
develop into a weak leader presiding over a feudal order, dominated by oligarchs and
regional barons, in which the people have little to say. Yet it is also possible that he
will lead Russia out of its chaotic, revolutionary, and anarchic recent past into a more
stable decade of economic growth and political stability - and economic growth and
political stability can help consolidate democratic institutions. Thus far, Putin has
provided mixed signals about the direction in which he wants to take Russia and he has
demonstrated a real indifference to democracy. Consequently, the only honest assessment to
be made at this stage is that democracy in Russia is not lost, but its future remains
uncertain.
The first step in coming to grips with post-Yeltsin Russia is to
understand why Putin won. The election reveals much about the evolution of Russia’s
political system and the mood of Russian society.
The simple explanation goes like this: Putin was chosen by Yeltsin and
his band of oligarchs as a loyal successor who would keep them out of jail and preserve
the existing system of oligarchic capitalism, in which oligarchs make money not by
producing or selling goods but by stealing from the state. To boost Putin’s
popularity in order to get him elected, they had to provoke a war with Chechnya. Some
assert that this cabal was even responsible for blowing up apartment buildings in Moscow
and elsewhere last fall - crimes that were attributed to Chechen terrorists - as a way to
bolster support for the war and Putin. This "popular" war, however, could
sustain Putin only for so long. Therefore Yeltsin resigned on 31 December 1999 to allow
the presidential election to take place three months earlier. As acting president, Putin
had at his disposal all the resources of the Russian state, which he wielded to win a
convincing election victory.
There is much truth to this simple account, but let’s look at the
reasons in more detail.
1. The Chechen war. In the summer of 1999, not everybody would believe that the military conflict in Chechnya would be the formula for delivering electoral success the following year. On the contrary, when Yeltsin ordered the Russian military to respond to the Chechen incursion into Dagestan in August 1999, most electoral analysts thought that the counteroffensive would result in another unpopular military debacle.
2. A vote for the future. Putin’s decisive response to the sense of insecurity that prevailed in Russia in the fall of 1999 is the reason why he initially rose in the polls. His Chechnya policy is not the only factor that enabled Putin to maintain a positive approval rating throughout the spring of 2000. In fact, the polls of Russian voters in December 1999 - January 2000 showed that 28 percent of those planning to vote for Putin believed that Chechnya should be allowed to leave the Russian Federation - almost as large as the proportion of Putin voters who believed that Russia should keep Chechnya at all costs. Thus other factors - more psychological than material in nature - also must have come into play. First, Putin symbolized for voters the end of revolution. For the first several years of the past decade, Russian politics was polarized by the struggle between communists and anticommunists. In his last years of power, Yeltsin futher fueled political instability by constantly changing prime ministers. Putin’s coming to power signaled for many an end to this volatile period.
Second, Putin’s lack of a record as a public leader allowed voters to project onto him their wishes and desires for the future.
3. The lack of an effective opposition. A third important reason why Putin won was the weak competition he faced. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) continues to dominate the space of opposition parties in Russian electoral politics, yet it has not generated new leaders or a new image.
4. The early election. By resigning on 31 December 1999 and thereby moving the electoral calendar forward three months, Yeltsin gave Putin the most important campaign present of all. According to Putin’s own advisors, his popularity peaked in mid-January. Later Putin lost the support of five million voters each month. Putin’s "no-campaign" campaign strategy was viable only in a short campaign season.
The fact that a man like Putin, whose credentials and proclivities are not prodemocratic, could be elected president of Russia nearly ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union suggests that the future of democracy in Russia is still uncertain.